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Abstract
Sure Start was set up in 1998 as a flagship policy of the first New Labour government,
with the promise of ten years funding. However, in 2003 it was superseded by plans for the
establishment of Children’s Centres, a universal programme rather than one for disadvantaged
areas as in the case of Sure Start local programmes. The government claimed that the shift to
Children’s Centres represented continuity, but, using historical methods and key informant
interviews, this paper shows that there was considerable change, particularly in the programme
content and governance of the new centres. The paper explores the reasons for the policy shift
in terms of factors arising from changes in government’s goals for Sure Start and for children’s
services more broadly on the one hand, and from evidence of programme failure on the other.
It concludes by reflecting on why the shift to Children’s Centres was claimed as continuity
rather than change, and what this tells us about the nature of policy change.
Sure Start was one of a number of social policy initiatives brought forward by
the New Labour government in the late 1990s, which incorporated ideas about
the importance of area-based initiatives (in health as well as education),1 of
strengthening communities, of tackling social exclusion and child poverty in
particular, of making interventions ‘evidence-based’ and of ‘modernising’ public
services by encouraging joined-up government and an ‘integrated’ approach
that cut across departmental and professional boundaries (Blair, 1997). Labour
made family policy an explicit part of its legislative programme and devoted
particularly large expenditure to subsidising part-time early years education for
all three and four-year olds and childcare on both the demand and supply sides.
The amount spent on Sure Start was less, but it was a ‘flagship’ policy for the new
administration that was also perceived to be popular (Glass, 2006; Eisenstadt,
2002).2
Sure Start was an early intervention programme, intended to bring together
a range of services, including family support, health services and support for
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special needs as well as childcare and education, in disadvantaged areas. The
aim was to ‘invest’3 in early childhood and to ‘help to ensure that children,
particularly those at risk of social exclusion are ready to learn when they arrive
at school’ (HMT, 1998: para. 1.14). Beginning in 1998 with 60 ‘trailblazer’ local
programmes (SSLPs) and with a further 250 SSLPs planned, expenditure was
more than doubled in 2000 in order to fund 530 programmes by 2004.4 Labour
made a ten-year funding commitment to Sure Start and also funded a major
national evaluation project.
It took three years for an SSLP to reach maturity, and the final wave of
local programmes was not approved until 2002. Yet in 2003 it was decided that
SSLPs would be replaced by Children’s Centres, which would cover the whole
country, albeit with a limited set of services for better-off areas. By 2006, the
majority of Sure Start local programmes were functioning as Children’s Centres.
Naomi Eisenstadt, the Director of the Sure Start Unit set up in 1998 under
the auspices of both the DfES and DH, wrote in 2003 to assure Sure Start local
programmes that ‘by embedding SSLPs in the local authority’s strategic vision for
the delivery of children’s services in your area, we will ensure that the additional
Children’s Centres’ funding will build on what you have already started and
improve mainstream services’ (Eisenstadt, 2003). In this interpretation, the move
to create a network of Children’s Centres represented the ‘mainstreaming’ of
Sure Start into a universal service. Indeed, the new Children’s Centres were
called ‘Sure Start Children’s Centres’, with advice offered by the Sure Start Unit
(DfES, 2006) on logos and ‘rebranding’, reflecting the importance of ‘market
recognition’ in what has always been a mixed economy of early years childcare
and education provision. However, some local authorities preferred to refer to the
new centres simply as ‘Children’s Centres’ from the first,5 and by the late 2000s
this usage was also common in many of the policy documents emanating from
central government. Indeed, because Children’s Centres were to be a universal
service, only a minority originated in SSLPs. Many more were added onto schools
and to existing early years provision such as neighbourhood nurseries and
early excellence centres, and some to primary health care trust buildings and
community centres.
This paper examines the extent to which the transition to Children’s Centres
represented continuity or change, and suggests that while the policy was framed6
in terms of continuity, in practice the extent to which changes were made was just
as striking. In particular, governance underwent radical change and, while many
elements of the Children’s Centres’ offer looked similar to those of SSLPs, the
emphasis was rather different, particularly in the importance accorded childcare
and early years education.
The paper uses historical methods to explore, first, the nature of the shift
in policy, drawing on the full range of policy documents from the Department
of Education and Skills (from 2007 the Department of Children, Schools and
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Families), the Treasury, the Sure Start Unit, Parliamentary Papers and the official
guidance. The findings of the National Evaluation of Sure Start are used both for
the information they provide about the workings of the SSLPs and for the part
they played in influencing policy. Second, the paper explores what these sources
reveal as to reasons for the policy shift, in terms of changes in the government’s
own agenda and external pressures. This part of the paper also draws on key
informant interviews, which provided very different perspectives on the key
reasons for the promotion of Children’s Centres,7 and documentary evidence
from two London boroughs. Finally, the paper reflects on the implications for a
broader understanding of policy change, drawing attention to the importance of
the role of strategic framing and of the politics of policy-making in particular.
Sure Start local programmes
Provision for young children under four was made the subject of one of New
Labour’s cross-departmental reviews when it came to power in 1997. Officials
from 11 government departments considered academic papers suggesting that
evidence from the UK and the US showed that early intervention programmes
were important for the development and life experience of children (HMT,
1998; see also Waldfogel, 1999; Melhuish, 2004). The aim of the programme
that emerged from the Review process – Sure Start – was intended to improve
children’s health and their social, emotional and cognitive development, and to
strengthen families and communities in disadvantaged areas. School readiness
was thus defined more widely than cognitive development, as was also the case
with the American Head Start programme, which was begun in 1965 as both a
child and community development programme in the context of the wider War
on Poverty (Zigler and Styfco, 2004). The policy problem was identified by British
policy-makers mainly in terms of family functioning and child poverty among
the socially excluded, and the thinking behind the creation of Sure Start focused
on finding a more integrated approach to tackling social exclusion among young
children and their families (HMT, 1998; Glass, 1999). There were large hopes for
Sure Start, which was seen as something of a ‘magic bullet’ that would, in the
long term, help to reduce youth crime, teenage pregnancy, family breakdown
and poverty. The introductory booklet accompanying the setting up of the fifth
wave of SSLPs in 2002 talked of ‘breaking the cycle of disadvantage’ (DfES,
2001, Foreword). However, Professor Sir Michael Rutter, adviser to the national
evaluation project, stated that, in his view, the ‘Government statements on what
it wanted SSLPs to achieve have lacked both consistency and precision’ (Rutter,
2007: 199).
The Sure Start local programmes launched in 1998 offered outreach and
home visits; support for families and parents (including support groups, drop-in
and parenting sessions); support for good-quality play, learning and childcare;
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primary and community healthcare and advice about child and family health; and
support for children with special needs. These constituted the core offer, but SSLPs
could also provide additional services: for example, advice on housing or welfare
benefits. The local programmes could offer a particular service themselves, or give
money to a provider to fund more of a particular service (for example, an extra
health visitor), or provide information to parents as to where to seek help. As
the National Evaluation showed, SSLPs were able to call on different amounts of
existing provision, and while most ‘inherited’ reasonable health provision, there
was usually little by way of childcare (Allnock et al., 2005). Each SSLP enjoyed
autonomy and, while it was obliged to provide the core offer and to work towards
nationally determined targets, how it did so was up to each local programme to
decide.
A set of key principles was laid down for SSLPs in the first official Guidance
offered by government: to coordinate, streamline and add value to existing
services (which required staff to work in cooperative and new ways); to involve
parents; to avoid stigma; to ensure lasting support for children and families; to act
in culturally appropriate and sensitive ways; to achieve specific objectives; and to
promote accessibility for all local families (DfEE, 1999a). Naomi Eisenstadt (2002:
3, 4) commented that ‘probably’ the most important of these was the injunction
to involve parents and carers: ‘The fundamental premise is that better outcomes
can only be achieved with the active participation of parents.’ The National
Evaluation found that parents were represented on the partnership boards of all
the 12 SSLPs studied in depth (Ball, 2002). Parents were also to be the subjects of
many dimensions of the intervention. Indeed, only provision for special needs
and for early years education8 focused on the child alone; other parts of the
SSLPs’ core offer were usually focused on the parent and child, or the parent
alone (Tunstill et al., 2005a). Many SSLPs expected parents to be present while
their children were attending a childcare session at the SSLP in order to learn how
to interact with their child (Anning et al., 2005).9 Engaging local communities and
local parents was central to the ethos of Sure Start (although, turning this on its
head, Clark (2006) has argued that Sure Start was as much about the promotion
of good parenting and the effective surveillance of mothers in particular (see also
Hey and Bradford, 2006)).
Certainly, the national targets for Sure Start reflected the focus on parents
(invariably mothers) as much as children. In common with all public services,
Public Service Agreements (PSAs) were set by the Treasury for Sure Start. Thus,
under the health objective, targets were set for reducing the proportion of mothers
who smoked, for increasing the proportion who breastfed and for reducing the
proportion of children admitted to hospital. The PSAs for children’s cognitive,
social and emotional development proved both hard to measure and difficult to
achieve. In practice, as Ellison et al. (nd, circa 2004–5: 23, 15) commented, there
was an ‘inevitable artificiality about the way activities [in SSLPs] are allocated to
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PSA targets’ not least because ‘the targets themselves were not necessarily what
Sure Start has actually been trying to achieve’. Many SSLPs made substantial
efforts to increase parental self-esteem and confidence, which were also hard to
measure and did not in any case figure in the PSA targets. Sure Start delivered
a range of services, depending on local demand and assessment of need. But
some targets, for instance achieving a reduction in mothers who smoked, were
not necessarily supported by the local community (Fox, 2005). As one London
voluntary agency contracted to provide services put it: ‘Sure Start is a very target
driven process, but parents are told that it is their wishes that are paramount.
Often they cannot reconcile these two concepts’ (sic) (Westminster Children’s
Society, 2003: 2).
The PSAs were frequently reviewed and the emphasis shifted substantially
over time. The 2002 Spending Review specifically changed the aims of Sure Start
to include an increase in the availability of childcare as a separate aim and, by
2004, the provision of childcare was tied firmly to the target of getting parents into
employment. But SSLPs did not develop into major childcare providers and in
fact the Neighbourhood Nursery Initiative in disadvantaged areas complemented
Sure Start in this respect.10 Norman Glass, who as a civil servant in the Treasury
had been involved in the setting up of Sure Start, maintained that supporting
parents into work was ‘an ambition for which it arguably was not funded, let
alone intended’ (Glass, 2006: 55). Because of its wide aims, it was possible for
Sure Start to mean all things to all people, but the ethos of Sure Start local
programmes was centred on local responsiveness, parent participation and child
development. There was no specific focus on early years education and care linked
to the provision of opportunities for parental employment.
Children’s Centres
The core offer for the Children’s Centres launched in 2003 was: integrated
early education and care, parental outreach, family support, health services,
information about other childcare providers and community services, effective
links with Jobcentre Plus and workforce training. Children’s Centres were to be a
universal service, but in the 70 per cent of areas that were better off, the intention
was to focus mainly on the provision of an information service. The greatest
emphasis was put on the need to provide integrated childcare and early years
education, and to reach the most disadvantaged, hard-to-reach parents – both
aims being strongly associated with the concern to promote adult employment
and to address the issue of workless families, which are disproportionately
numerous in the UK compared to other EU Member States (NAO, 2007). The first
major report of quantitative findings from the National Evaluation had identified
this group as being particularly hard to reach by SSLPs (NESS, 2005). Increasing
concern about the evidence-base for programmes delivered by SSLPs, also raised
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by the National Evaluation, resulted in an effort to promote more standardised
family support programmes from the list issued by the National Academy of
Parenting Practitioners, established in 2007.
The principles underpinning Children’s Centres were said to be the same
as SSLPs; Margaret Hodge, the Minister responsible, told the Select Committee
on Education and Skills that Children’s Centres would be ‘community driven,
parent driven and will retain that essence of Sure Start which has made it so
successful’ (House of Commons Education and Skills Committee, 2005, Q. 479).
In 2006, Beverley Hughes, Minister for Children and Families, described the Sure
Start local programmes to this Committee in terms of an ‘experimental stage’,
which had let a ‘thousand flowers bloom’ (House of Commons Education and
Skills Committee, 2006, Q. 7), laying the groundwork for the new universal,
mainstream service. These statements were part of a series of ex post facto
constructions of the shift from SSLPs to Children’s Centres in terms of continuity
rather than change. Yet in the new emphasis on childcare and education and on
the nature of governance, change was more apparent than continuity.
Children’s Centres were first mooted in the 2002 Report of the Inter-
Departmental Committee on Childcare as a particularly effective way of providing
good-quality, integrated childcare and early years education (DfES, DWP, HMT
and Women and Equality Unit, 2002, chapter 4). A major focus of this report
was on ways of meeting the government’s objective of getting 70 per cent of lone
mothers into work, which in turn was seen as part of what was needed to halve
child poverty by 2010. The much greater place given to childcare provision in the
core offer of Children’s Centres from their launch in 2003 was reflected in the
changes in governance at central government level. In 2002, cross-departmental
responsibility for Sure Start moved from the DfES and the DH to the DfES and the
DWP. The Sure Start Unit was merged with the Early Years Division and Childcare
Unit, creating a single group responsible for SSLPS, neighbourhood nurseries and
the National Childcare Strategy, underlining the stronger emphasis on childcare
and its connection to supporting parents into work. Children’s Centres were set
targets for the creation of new childcare places and, from September 2008, centres
were obliged to provide fully integrated early years education and full daycare,
which the Effective Provision of Pre-School Education (EPPE) project had found
to be particularly beneficial for child outcomes (Sylva et al., 2004).
In respect of local governance, Children’s Centres were made the
responsibility of local authorities, which managed the allocation of the
government grant (SSLPs had been funded directly by the DfES, with the lead
partner on the partnership board managing the grant). In part, this change also
reflected the focus on childcare and education. The 2002 Inter-Departmental
Review of childcare pointed out that the Early Years Development and Childcare
Partnerships, which had been given the responsibility of managing the childcare
market at the local level in 1998 (Lewis, 2003; Penn and Randall, 2005), were
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more successful when the local authority was actively involved (DfES, DWP,
HMT, Women and Equality Unit, 2002), and the 2006 Childcare Act gave local
authorities a statutory responsibility to ensure that there were enough childcare
places for parents in work or training. In part, the change was also linked to the
profound restructuring of children’s services undertaken under the auspices of
the Every Child Matters agenda (HMT, 2003), launched in 2003, for it would have
proved difficult to leave SSLPs outside the reconfigured services for children at
the local level.
The first, brief, official guidance for Children’s Centres issued in 2003
reiterated the need to involve parents, but by consultation above all, and to
develop an understanding of community development rather than to encourage
active participation, as had been the intention with SSLPs.11 While SSLPs were
never ‘bottom-up’, in so far as parents were very much a minority voice on
the partnership boards responsible for their governance, responsiveness to local
needs and preferences, community development and empowerment were explicit
aims of the programme (Williams and Churchill, 2006) in a way that they were
not for Children’s Centres.
Children’s Centres were made part of ‘mainstream’ provision for young
children in all local authorities, but it is less certain as to whether in so doing a
Sure Start approach was ‘mainstreamed’. The local responsiveness that had let a
thousand flowers bloom in terms of the nature and balance of the SSLPs’ service
offer gave way to a more specified service offer with an emphasis on integrated
childcare and education for children in conjunction with links to Jobcentre Plus
for their parents, and greater control by the local authority to make sure it
happened. A similar trajectory from a community-oriented to a more centrally
mandated programme marked the experience of Head Start in the US (Levitan,
1969; Cohen, 1996). Newly created Children’s Centres were often attached to
schools (as had been the EECs),12 which reflected the importance attached to
early years education and care in the Children’s Centres’ offer and to the new
requirements under the 2006 Childcare Act for local authorities to ensure an
adequate number of places.
However, ‘mainstreaming’ Sure Start into a universal service had significant
cost implications. On average, SSLPs in their third year of operation spent £900
per child (at 1999–2000 prices), with a minimum spend of £350 and a maximum
of almost £2,500 (Meadows, 2006). The funding for Children’s Centres was less
than that for SSLPs. The Minister responsible, Beverly Hughes, told the 2006
Select Committee on Education and Skills that it was close to 66–70 per cent of
the level reached by SSLPs (House of Commons Education and Skills Committee,
2006, Q.29). The Public Accounts Committee expressed fears about the dilution
of support for disadvantaged areas (House of Commons Committee on Public
Accounts, 2007), and the National Audit Office (2006) expressed concern about
the sustainability of Children’s Centres. At the local level there was also concern
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about ‘who will pick up the tab on the new services once central government
money dwindles’ (City of Westminster, 2002: 2).
The reasons for the policy shift
The reasons for the shift to Children’s Centres are related in part to changes in
government’s policy agenda in respect of the service offer made by SSLPs and of
services for young children more generally, and in part to evidence of programme
failure offered by the National Evaluation.
First, Sure Start’s ethos and practice became increasingly out of step with
government policy in regard to childcare. The emphasis on making provision
for integrated childcare and education, linked to supporting parents into work,
was very different from the relatively minor part accorded childcare in Sure Start
local programmes, and reflected the way in which government’s thinking on
childcare in relation to social exclusion had developed. SSLPs had often provided
some childcare – in the form of informal drop-in and ‘stay and play’ provision
as well as cre`ches and sessional day care – mainly in order to encourage parents
to take part in other Sure Start activities, but their provision of formal childcare
for working parents remained low (Tunstill et al., 2005a). The aim was thus to
support parents seeking to attend courses that might improve their employability
or to enhance the parent/child relationship. Much less attention was paid to the
cognitive development of children, especially in the cre`ches (Anning et al., 2005;
see also Mathers et al., 2007). In their report for the National Evaluation on the
employability of parents in 25 SSLPs, Meadows and Garbers (2004) concluded
that SSLPs acted mainly as a bridge for parents into the education, training and
employment services of other organisations, not least because of the common
local perception that the mothers of young children should stay at home. No
SSLP in their sample told parents that they should be working.
But in 2003, the Work and Pensions Select Committee warned that the
number of childcare places was not likely to be enough to allow the 2010 targets on
child poverty and employment for lone mothers to be met (House of Commons
Work and Pensions Committee, 2003: 15). Government plans for the development
of childcare over the period 2004–2014 (HMT, DfES, DWP and DTI, 2004) made
specific reference to the increased contribution that would be made by Children’s
Centres. At the same time, government was pushing ahead with more out-
of-school care for older children: by 2010, all schools would be obliged to be
open from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. – the better to serve the needs of working parents.
Some local authorities made an immediate connection between the need to
provide ‘extended schools’ and new Children’s Centres (for example, City of
Westminster, 2005: 4–5), the majority of which have been located in schools
rather than other community-based institutions. This in turn tended to give more
emphasis to educational attainment than to the community-based initiatives and
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community-led services promoted by SSLPs, which were more likely to have been
based in community institutions other than schools.
Second, the government’s agenda for services for young children
more generally underwent substantial change. Children’s services underwent
fundamental review as a result of the Every Child Matters agenda, implemented
in the wake of the inquiry into child protection. Stress was placed on the
importance of prevention, together with a strong emphasis on children’s
educational achievement. Integrated services13 for children were to be provided
under Directors of Children’s Services appointed by local authorities, and it would
have been impractical to leave out the SSLPS, which were accountable directly to
central government in the form of the Sure Start Unit.
The new vision of a universal network of integrated children’s services at the
local level also meant the end of Sure Start as an area-based programme. Both the
National Evaluation and the Daycare Trust (a long-standing campaigning group
for formal childcare provision) had made the point that not all disadvantaged
children lived in deprived areas (Tunstill et al., 2005b; Land, 2002). The provision
of Mini-Sure Start local programmes in rural areas and in small pockets of
urban deprivation from 2002 was designed to address this, but pressure for more
universal coverage remained. In 2003, the Work and Pensions Select Committee
argued in favour of a universal Children’s Centres model (House of Commons
Work and Pensions Committee, 2003: 22). By the mid-2000s, Labour politicians
were speaking of the importance of ‘progressive universalism’ (for example, Balls,
2005), which in the case of services meant universal provision, with the greatest
help for those in the most need. This principle was articulated clearly in the
2005 pre-budget report (HMT and DfES, 2005), and in the 2007 Children’s Plan,
which promoted the idea of universal services operating in a preventative system
(DCSF, 2007).
Third, strong evidence of programme failure was offered by the National
Evaluation, which was all the more serious given the premium the government
attached to evidence-based policy as a means to its pragmatic commitment to
identifying and funding ‘what works’.
The emphasis on area-based programmes in the policy fields of housing,
health and education, as well as early years, faded out of the policy picture,
largely because of the tension between central direction and local empowerment
(see Coote et al., 2004). As Naomi Eistenstadt commented: ‘The key debate, which
still rages about Sure Start, was the commitment to local flexibility; [and] funding
based on plans to deliver specific child outcomes rather than specific services’
(Eisenstadt, 2007: ix). The idea of local flexibility incorporated a commitment to
community ‘empowerment’ and to local responsiveness, which sometimes made
the pursuit of PSA targets (which, pace Eisenstadt, covered mothers’ behaviour
as well as children’s welfare and development) difficult. Despite central control,
SSLPs had enjoyed autonomy in the way in which they went about their work,
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which resulted in tensions regarding the effectiveness of the programmes they
chose to use and how far their work was oriented towards achieving better
outcomes as opposed to community engagement. It was difficult both to work
towards PSAs and to put responsiveness to parent-determined needs first.
The 1999 Guide to Evidence-based Practice said that Sure Start had been
‘planned on the basis of sound evidence from international research’ (DfEE,
1999b: 3), but, in their volume summarising the findings of the National
Evaluation, Melhuish and Hall (2007) claimed that while research evidence was
critical in winning the argument for Sure Start at the beginning, it was overlooked
in the detailed planning and operation of the local programmes. Sure Start had
no in-built plan for evaluation; each local programme was different in terms of
the nature, volume and mix of services it offered. Nor did the initiative require
the use of standardised programmes, for example to encourage good parenting.
All this made it very difficult to assess the outcomes (Kane, 2008; see also Hansen
and Hawkes, 2009), which is what the quantitative part of the National Evaluation
hoped to do and which was particularly important for a government focused on
outcomes rather than process.
It was additionally difficult to come to any quick conclusions about outcomes
associated with SSLPs. Not only did the local programmes usually take three years
to become fully operational, but the hope was that the effects of the programmes
would be revealed in terms of school readiness, and also later in the child’s life: for
example, in regard to increasing rates of educational achievement and decreasing
rates of juvenile crime. However, it was expected by some civil servants and
politicians that some of the PSA targets set for Sure Start would be achieved in
two or three years. But as Kane (2008)14 argued, it was too early and too difficult
to assess the impact of Sure Start.
The National Evaluation, which started 18 months into the second wave
of SSLPs (in 2000), published its interim findings in 2005 and they were not
encouraging. In particular, the National Evaluation found only modest benefits
for the moderately disadvantaged and small adverse effects for those most at risk –
the very people policy-makers were most concerned to reach (NESS, 2005). A
similar conclusion regarding the effects on the most disadvantaged was reached
in the US in respect of Early Head Start (Love et al., 2002), which served the
under threes.
Glass (2006) has suggested that government moved to change Sure Start in
anticipation of these findings. Press reactions to the national evaluation’s interim
findings, which were leaked prior to publication, were strong, with a majority
claiming that Sure Start had ‘failed’ (Phillips, 2005; Marrin, 2005; Toynbee, 2005;
Ward, 2005; Wheatcroft, 2005). When the Minister responsible, Margaret Hodge,
appeared before the Education and Skills Committee in 2005 and said that Sure
Start Children’s Centres would ‘retain that essence of Sure Start which has made it
so successful’ (see above), the Chairman replied that two thirds of SSLPs had been
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shown to be unsuccessful (House of Commons Education and Skills Committee,
2005, Q.480). A supplementary memorandum submitted by Hodge after her
appearance before the Committee suggested that no evidence of impact should
not be interpreted as evidence of no impact (House of Commons Education and
Skills Committee, 2005: 191; see also Glass, 2006). In 2006, as the first substantial
guidance was being issued to Children’s Centres, Tony Blair, then Prime Minister,
talked about the importance of reaching the hard-to-reach families, who had
remained excluded (Blair, 2006). The primary policy goal in setting up Sure
Start had to do with tackling social exclusion, but the interim findings from the
National Evaluation seemed to indicate that it had not succeeded in respect of
the most disadvantaged families.
Professor Sir Michael Rutter, writing in a personal capacity rather than as
an adviser to the National Evaluation, criticised policy-makers for rejecting both
pilot projects and a random controlled trial (RCT) when setting up Sure Start,
which he viewed as crucial to the provision of a robust evidence base : ‘Cynics
might also argue that an RCT had to be ruled out because, if it did not show that it
was effective, it carried the danger of showing that a key Government policy was a
mistake’ (Rutter, 2006: 136). He suggested that, in the end, evidence-based policy
was trumped by political pressure (Rutter, 2007), and that the mainstreaming of
Sure Start was happening without demonstration of its effectiveness. As Tunstill
et al. (2005a: 168), who were involved in the qualitative research on process for
the National Evaluation, put it: ‘At face value it may be argued that in this case
national policy has evolved in advance of conclusive evaluation findings.’
However, it was doubtful that findings from the evaluation could ever
be conclusive, given the problems the evaluators faced in establishing causal
relationships for a programme that varied so much from place to place. Indeed,
in 2008, new quantitative findings from the National Evaluation reversed the
findings in respect of the most disadvantaged families: now no adverse effects
were observed (Melhuish et al., 2008; NESS, 2008). The evaluators concluded,
albeit cautiously, that this could be attributed to the ‘maturing’ of SSLPs as
they became Children’s Centres with more ‘clearly focussed services with better
guidance’ and claimed that the improvement was ‘partly influenced by the early
NESS findings’ (NESS, 2008: 30). They gave the example of the successful use of
the same standardised parenting programme in 11 SSLPs in north and mid-Wales
(Hutchings et al., 2007).15
But the idea of politics trumping the best efforts of social scientists was only
part of the story. The evaluators may well have done the best they could in the
absence of rigorous implementation (Rutter, 2007); however, the findings they
published in 2005 in particular made them policy actors. These findings may well
have influenced the guidance issued in respect of Children’s Centres, but in the
first instance they made it difficult to defend SSLPs. The policy shift to Children’s
Centres was in part a political reaction to the 2005 findings.16 Notwithstanding
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the shortcomings of the Evaluation’s methodology, the findings made it possible
to charge Sure Start with ‘failure’.
By the time more positive findings were issued in 2008, SSLPs had been
‘mainstreamed’ according to policy-makers, or, more plausibly in the light of
the extent of the changes to the programme, ‘absorbed’ into Children’s Centres,
which in turn had been brought into the mainstream policy development of
children’s services and childcare and education. The guidance for Children’s
Centres highlighted the importance of increasing childcare places and of reaching
the most disadvantaged families, the first of these being in line with government’s
own rapidly expanding policy agenda for childcare and early years education, and
the second acknowledging the question mark the 2005 National Evaluation posed
over the SSLPs’ success in tackling social exclusion.17
Changes in central government’s policy agenda for Sure Start and for policies
for young children more generally were important in explaining the shift to
Children’s Centres, but it is also the case that government was ‘hoist on its own
petard’ of promoting evidence-based policies when the National Evaluation cast
doubt over Sure Start’s achievements. The government’s commitment to rapid
and transformative policy change was difficult to maintain in parallel with a
commitment to evidence-based policy development, which is likely to be much
slower, requiring the use of pilot projects and/or RCTs, which are in turn likely to
be difficult to defend politically in a highly centralised state where differences in
the provision of services (for example, in respect of NHS drug policies) are met
with public disapproval.
Conclusion: understanding the policy change
The transition from SSLPs to Children’s Centres constituted a substantial change
in policy, which was nevertheless presented by politicians as continuity rather
than change. The overarching policy goal of tackling social exclusion remained,
but government’s ideas as to how best to achieve it shifted, resulting in changes
in the programme’s content, governance and reach.
In respect of programme content, a focus on support for children and
their parents gave way to an emphasis on children’s cognitive development
on the one hand, and parents’ employment on the other. In addition, the
mainstreaming of Children’s Centres as a new, universal local service under
the control of local government marked a major change from the centralised
control of SSLPs, which had nevertheless (somewhat paradoxically) enjoyed
substantial autonomy in regard to the service offer they made. While statements
as to government’s commitment to ‘empowering’ families continued to be made
(for example, Cabinet Office and DCSF, 2008), parental participation, together
with responsiveness to local demand and local need, gave way to a more centrally
specified service offer. The PSAs for Children’s Centres were more closely aligned
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with the core offer that emphasised early years education and childcare, and links
with Jobcentre Plus.
However, representing Children’s Centres as a continuation of the ‘essence’
of Sure Start allowed government to claim the success of a flagship programme,
while also changing it significantly to meet both its changing ideas as to how best
to meet its core goal of tackling social exclusion, as well as academic and press
criticism about the failure to reach the most disadvantaged. Taken together these
points explain the policy shift, with the negative findings of National Evaluation
providing the catalyst for a substantial policy change that was presented as the
development of Sure Start.
The effort strategically to frame the policy (Campbell, 1998) in terms of
continuity while making important changes enabled government to hang on to
a flagship policy in which considerable investment of public money had been
made and to avoid both blame for policy failure in the wake of the National
Evaluation’s interim findings published in 2005 and a possible backlash by
voters angry at the abandonment of a popular programme. Paul Pierson’s (1994)
work on policy change in a period of welfare state restructuring has shown
the political importance of ‘blame avoidance’. Thus, a government committed
to transformative policy change nevertheless sought to claim policy continuity.
Strategic framing to justify reform and as an aid to the pragmatic politics of
policy-making is the most important factor in understanding how politicians
changed course on Sure Start.
The idea of framing the policy shift as the ‘mainstreaming’ of Sure Start,
while nevertheless making significant changes, was a way of satisfying both
critics of Sure Start and its many committed defenders. In 2008, the government
announced its wish to put Sure Start Children’s Centres ‘on a legislative basis’ to
ensure that they become ‘an established part of the universal services available for
young children and their families’ (DCSF, 2008a: 1). This will make governance of
Children’s Centres much clearer. In addition, having committed large amounts
of public expenditure first to SSLPs and then to Children’s Centres, this move
may be interpreted as a desire institutionally to embed this early years’ initiative
and to protect it from possible future political attack.
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Notes
1 On the fate of the Education Action Zones, see West and Currie (2008) and Halpin et al.
(2004), and on area-based initiatives more generally see Coote et al. (2004).
2 Empirical evidence for this came later (Avis et al., 2007; Ridley-Moy, 2007).
3 By the early 2000s, the language of ‘social investment’ became more dominant (Lister,
2003).
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 29 Aug 2013 IP address: 158.143.197.48
84 jane lewis
4 In 2002/3 total capital and revenue expenditure on Sure Start was £680m. In 2003/4, the first
year in which Children’s Centres were also included, and in which spending on childcare
and some nursery education was merged, the figure rose to £721m, reaching £921m in
2004/5, £1,240m in 2005/6 and £1,346m in 2006/7 (DCSF, 2008b).
5 For example, Wandsworth Borough Council in London called their centres ‘integrated
children’s centres’, a designation also used in Wales.
6 On the importance of ‘framing’ see Scho¨n and Rein (1994), Blythe (2001) and Campbell
(1998, 2002).
7 Interviewees were promised anonymity and confidentiality. It is important to emphasise
that this whole piece of policy development is controversial and that key policy actors do
not share a common view.
8 The government’s 1998 National Childcare Strategy included universal provision of
twelve and half hours per week early education for four-year olds, followed by the
same for three-year olds. This was provided in maintained nursery schools and classes
and by private, voluntary and independent providers. Very little was provided by
SSLPs.
9 The same expectation characterised Head Start programmes in the early years: ‘In fact, the
expectation was that parents would not be working but would be available to participate in
the program’ (Cohen, 1996: 31).
10 There were 1,400 neighbourhood nurseries by 2005 (Smith et al., 2007).
11 It should be noted that in a 2002 speech about Sure Start, Paul Boateng, then Chief
Secretary to the Treasury, still talked of the importance of community empowerment;
however, mention of this was notably infrequent after 2003 (Boateng, 2002).
12 Bertram et al. (2001, 2002) and Sylva and Pugh (2005) assumed that EECs were the model
for Children’s Centres; see also Pugh (2003).
13 The Start-Up Guidance for Children’s Centres, issued in 2003, defined ‘integration’ in
terms of a shared philosophy, principles and vision, and, between workers from different
disciplines, a shared identity, purpose and working practices (DfES, 2003: 10), but the term
is defined in different ways by different actors.
14 Kane (2008) also raised questions about the Evaluation’s methodology (in particular, the
use of comparator areas drawn from the Millennium Cohort data, which preceded the
SSLP data by two years), and how far it was possible to draw conclusions on the basis of
those responding to the survey (non-responders may have been equally or more in need of
services). The variation in the balance and nature of local service provision, together with
the issue of what existed prior to the setting up of Sure State local programmes made it
difficult to assess impact.
15 This was a randomised controlled trial, but unfortunately the date of the fieldwork is not
specified.
16 The early evaluation of Head Start by the Westinghouse Learning Corporation – Ohio
University, which also reported negative findings, had a similarly strong political effect
(Williams and Evans, 1969).
17 Hilary Armstrong, Minister for the Cabinet Office and Social Exclusion, estimated that 2
per cent of families had been unable to ‘take advantage’ of the new opportunities afforded
by government (Armstrong, 2008: 1).
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